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1. The Rule of Rescue 
The idea of the rule of rescue, as was is coined by Albert Jonsen (1986, 172), is 
sometimes invoked in discussions about priority setting in public healthcare, especially 
with respect to offering access to beneficial yet very expensive treatment. Appealing to 
this rule involves drawing an analogy between cases where persons in dire need can be 
rescued (the lone sailor lost at sea, trapped miners, or a child fallen down a well) and a 
patient whose life might be saved or at least extended for a longer time if some expensive 
treatment is made available. In the first type of case it seems morally inappropriate to 
suggest that rescue operations are to be abandoned because they are too expensive and 
that more good can be done by investing resources elsewhere. It might be easier to argue 
that there is no hope left for a successful rescue—but this suggests that at least all 
possible means to save the endangered ones have been tried and appear to be vain. In 
public healthcare, considerations of cost-effectiveness are, however, common, and, partly 
also for reasons of equality, not unreasonable. Some treatments may be considered highly 
worthwhile for individual patients—possibly even effective in saving or extending their 
lives—yet fail to satisfy some accepted thresholds of cost-effectiveness, simply because 
they are extremely expensive. This especially occurs in the case of uncommon diseases 
that are incurable, such as some congenital metabolic diseases. For example, patients 
with lysosomal storage diseases, such as Fabry or Pompe, might benefit from enzyme 
replacement therapy, but the effect of treatment will stop when the treatment is stopped. 
The costs of enzyme replacement treatment may amount up to €350,000 per patient per 
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year, which raises questions about whether funding or reimbursement is justified 
(Schlander and Beck 2009). Whether enzyme treatments are indeed effective in saving or 
extending the life of patients with these specific diseases is up for debate. For the sake of 
discussion I will assume that some medical treatments for uncommon diseases are indeed 
life-saving yet too expensive to be considered within an accepted range of cost-
effectiveness. 
I take the rule of rescue to be the general statement that saving the lives of some 
persons who are in need here and now may justify investing much energy and money, 
even if it is clear that society could prevent many more deaths by investing such 
resources in prevention. In this way, the rule of rescue involves a particular stance in the 
problem of identified versus statistical victims. Altough the rule of rescue is not always 
explicitly invoked in practice, societies are often much more prepared to invest money in 
curative treatment than in prevention (Nord et al. 1995; NICE Citizens Council 2006). 
This tendency can be easily explained, for example, by pointing out that it is much easier 
for most of us to sympathize and identify with victims who “have a face” than with 
unknown “statistical persons” who will die unless preventive measures are taken. Yet 
such explanation does not justify the rule of rescue; indeed, from a perspective of justice 
and equality, one should be suspicious toward allocation policies that are based upon 
feelings of sympathy. Arguably it is easier to sympathize with the nice-looking mother of 
two children who is in need of care than with the not-so-good-looking and unemployed 
single patient who has few family or friends to support his claims to treatment—but such 
differences may well be morally irrelevant. If we are looking for a moral justification for 
the rule of rescue, appealing to sympathy cannot be enough. This does not imply that 
sympathy as such is irrelevant. Giving some priority to rescuing persons with whom we 
sympathize (rather than prioritizing preventive measures that will save only statistical 
lives) may help to sustain an important moral sentiment, sympathy, that is indispensable 
in our moral practices. However, where resources are scarce and need to be allocated 
fairly, just following our sympathies will often be arbitrary and unfair. 
Before discussing possible justifications for the rule of rescue, two clarifications 
are in order. First, the rule of rescue as presented above is about choosing for treatment or 
prevention, but it is does not necessarily imply that it is about the choice between life-
saving treatment of patients with a specific disease X and preventive measures against X. 
Such a choice might not be very realistic, for that matter, but anyway, the issue at stake is 
about resource allocation more generally: should investments in life-saving treatment of 
assignable patients be given priority even if this is much less cost-effective than other 
measures that prevent fatal disease. For the sake of discussion I will assume a fixed 
budget of health expenditures, so that accepting the rule of rescue, given its focus on 
interventions that are less efficient, would imply that more lives are lost (or less health 
benefits achieved) with the same resources. 
Second, focusing on a general justification for the rule of rescue implies that 
many contextual factors—which could be relevant in specific situations—will be left out 
of the analysis. For example, zooming in on specific conditions and diseases may reveal 
particular features that may support funding expensive treatment without appeal to the 
rule of rescue. If society is in some way responsible for the fact that a patient became 
severely ill, this might be reason to offer access to treatment even if it is considered not 
cost-effective. And in the case of patients with severe inborn diseases, who have been ill 
most of their childhood and adolescence, and have had few opportunities to live a life of 
their own, offering very beneficial yet expensive treatment may be considered a way of 
promoting fair equality of opportunity. Such considerations may be central in specific 
cases, but will not play a role in our general discussion of the rule of rescue. 
2. Individualist versus Collectivist Perspectives 
It is tempting to understand the debate about the rule of rescue as being about a tension 
between what we owe to individual persons and what is best from a collectivist 
perspective. After all, the problem involves conflicting demands of caring for an 
individual patient in immediate need of treatment and saving more lives, which would 
reduce the risk within the population at large. Hence, one would expect that individualist 
normative arguments might support the rule of rescue, whereas collectivist or other 
utilitarian approaches would point in the opposite direction. Scanlon’s contractualism 
seems to be a good candidate for defending the rule of rescue, because it restricts moral 
deliberation to claims of individuals and rejects the idea that very strong claims of one 
individual can be outweighed by impersonal concerns or by combining less strong 
reasons of many individuals (Scanlon 1998). In this chapter, however, I argue that 
Scanlon’s theory of what we owe to each other—with its specific focus on the strengths 
of claims of individuals—cannot render support for the rule of rescue. In contrast, a more 
collectivist approach that aims to promote group-related values does offer some support 
for favoring rescue. 
3. What We Owe to Individual Patients in Need of Live-Saving Treatment 
One of the basic ideas in Scanlon’s theory of what we owe to each other is that actions 
should be justifiable to any other person who is motivated to find and endorse moral 
principles that can be accepted by all. Justification involves making clear that certain 
action is permitted by a general principle that no one (even those for whom the principle 
is least attractive) could reasonably reject. In practice such moral deliberation consists of 
exploring what the implications of different principles are for different persons concerned 
and weighing the reasons they have for rejecting or accepting such implications. These 
reasons should be generic reasons, that is, personal reasons people have in virtue of their 
situation and general characteristics: they are based upon what persons in such situations 
have reason to want—not on an individual’s specific preferences or desires (Scanlon 
1998). Moral deliberation then involves comparing the strength of reasons individual 
persons may invoke for rejecting possible principles. A very strong reason of one person 
P (e.g., accepting this principle will imply that I will not be saved and hence will die) 
cannot be outweighed by combining the much weaker reasons of many other persons Q1, 
Q2,...,Qn (e.g., not accepting this principle will be inconvenient for me). Scanlon thus 
rejects an aggregative approach in such trade-offs. Yet if the trade-off is between 
conflicting reasons of comparable strength, the contractualist can make room for the 
intuition that “the numbers count” (Scanlon 1998; Hirose 2001). 
How to evaluate the rule of rescue following a contractualist approach? Arguably, 
any patient with a rare life-threatening disease whose life depends on access to treatment 
that is highly expensive has very strong reasons to support the rule of rescue and reject 
alternative policies that would imply that patients in this position will not survive. How 
do these reasons weigh against reasons to reject the rule of rescue? The rule of rescue 
allows implementing life-saving therapies for patients at the cost of more efficient 
preventive policies, and thus has the implication that other lives are lost. This, however, 
seems to yield reasons for rejecting the rule of rescue that are comparable in strength to 
the reasons some patients have to endorse the rule. 
Yet whose lives are at stake here? In a way, everyone who might benefit from the 
preventive strategy has reasons to reject the rule of rescue (Hope 2001). But how strong 
are their reasons compared to those of a patient for whom the rule of rescue means 
survival? The problem with prevention is that success mostly consists of bad things not 
happening, and it may be impossible to know even with hindsight who actually has 
benefited from a preventive policy. Persons who are vaccinated against several infectious 
diseases will never know whether they would have otherwise experienced a dangerous 
infection. Of course, they do benefit in the sense that knowledge about the fact that one is 
protected can take away worries about getting that specific disease. Everyone 
participating in a prevention program has a chance to benefit, but few will benefit in the 
sense of avoiding untimely death. And as far as the harms are counterfactual, there is not 
a specific person who benefits. The lives saved are statistical, not identifiable. 
This raises the question of how contractualism is to take into account the points of 
view of persons who benefit from a principle that prioritizes efficient life-saving 
prevention over expensive life-saving therapies. The perspectives can be included ex ante 
or ex post. If we look at prevention ex ante we include the perspectives of healthy 
persons who might benefit from prevention. For them, opting for the rule of rescue rather 
than for the alternative principle implies a somewhat increased risk to their lives. That is 
a valid reason for rejecting the rule of rescue, but arguably it does not outweigh the 
conflicting reasons of a patient who has immediate need of expensive life-saving 
expensive treatment and for whom rejection of the rule of rescue will imply premature 
death. No healthy person who would benefit from prevention is, at this stage, as badly off 
as the patient is. Hence, it would be unreasonable to reject the rule of rescue: the 
alternative principle cannot be justified to patients whose life depends on the rule of 
rescue. 
However, an alternative way to deliberate about the rule of rescue is to look at 
prevention ex post. This involves including the perspective of persons who 
(hypothetically) will have profited from life-saving prevention. Their reason for rejecting 
the rule of rescue is not that it will rob them of a small chance to benefit from prevention; 
their lives depend on prevention, just as the patients’ lives depend on the rule of rescue. 
For contractualism it does not have to be a problem that we cannot know in advance 
whose lives will be lost if the preventive measures are not taken. It is sufficient to know 
the generic reasons these persons would have: what any person would have reason to 
want given the situation she finds herself in. Now obviously, she will have reason to 
reject the rule of rescue if it implies that her premature death will not be prevented. This 
reason is exactly the same as some patients have for endorsing the rule of rescue and 
rejecting principles that favor prevention. Both the nonidentifiable persons who benefit 
from prevention and the identifiable patients in need of life-saving treatment can 
complain that they will die if they do not get what they need. But, as mentioned above, if 
the reasons for and against rejecting a principle are equally strong, then contractualists 
may accept that the numbers do count. We have defined the rule of rescue as prioritizing, 
at least sometimes, life-saving treatment over more cost-effective life-saving prevention. 
By definition, then, there will be more persons in the hypothetical situation whose life 
depends on prevention than persons whose lives depend on rescue, and the combined 
reasons of the former will outweigh the equal yet fewer claims of the latter. Looking at 
prevention ex post thus results in a reasonable rejection of the rule of rescue.2 
4. Excluding Ex Post Perspectives? 
So in thinking about the rule of rescue, do we need to take into account ex ante or ex post 
views on prevention or both? Contractualism will support the rule of rescue only if we 
exclude ex post perspectives. In a way the debate about the rule of rescue can be 
considered a debate about the relative weight of claims of patients in immediate need and 
persons who might be saved in the future. Hence, a contractualist argument for the rule of 
rescue that only takes into account ex ante perspectives would be begging the question. 
Proponents of the rule of rescue need an additional argument for that choice. 
One plausible concern about ex post perspectives is that including them makes 
contractualist deliberations extremely risk-averse. The argument is analogous to Elisabeth 
Ashford’s (2003) analysis of the demandingness of contractualism, and it points at the 
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endorses the ex post perspective. Cf. Scanlon 1998, 209. 
fact that many practices and policies are beneficial to almost anyone, but also come with 
remote risk, more specifically, will cost the lives of some.3 Air travel and livestock 
farming are two examples. Many people benefit from being able to fly. Yet some persons 
will be killed when an aircraft crashes in their city. Many enjoy consuming animal 
products like meat or cheese; yet some will be victim of an outbreak of epizootic disease 
such as swine flu. The likelihood that one will be harmed in this way may be extremely 
remote, but, being in that situation (hence, ex post), one will have very strong reasons to 
reject principles that allowed the risk in the first place. The complaints of victims against 
allowing air travel will easily outweigh concerns of all other persons that not being 
allowed to fly will be burdensome to them. This not only applies equally to livestock 
farming, but to any practice or activity that comes with a remote risk. Or, as far as certain 
practices are inevitable, they can only be justified if maximum precautions are taken to 
reduce the chance of fatal harm.4 Taking maximum precautions may be burdensome to 
almost anyone, but those burdens do not outweigh the complaints a victim whose life the 
precautions aim to protect—unless the precautions themselves are so extensive that they 
create lethal risks themselves. 
Such risk-averse implications of including ex post perspectives seem quite absurd, 
or at least unreasonable. This judgment of unreasonableness, however, depends on some 
form of aggregation in which the burdens of precautions for many people outweigh the 
very remote risk that someone will die if no precautions are taken—and this is exactly the 
sort of aggregation that Scanlon rejects. Hence, the argument that including ex post 
perspectives would have unreasonable risk-averse implications does not cohere with 
contractualism. Contractualists can argue that excessive precautions against remote risk 
may be unreasonable if every person—for example, as traveler or as consumer—benefits 
from allowing air traffic or livestock farming. This is because all of them may think that 
the clear benefits of traveling or consumption of animal products clearly outweigh the 
highly unlikely risk of being severely harmed by air traffic or epizootic disease. 
                                                            
3 The	  argument	  may	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4 The example of air travel is more complex, because air travel enables us to save lives as well—arguably 
many more than the number of people who die on the ground as a result of airplane crashes. Taking ex post 
perspectives into account, the most reasonable principle would be one that adopted maximum precautions 
against airplane crashes, including restrictions on using air travel for “frivolous” purposes such as holidays. 
Moreover, it would be unreasonable for a person who has always traveled by plane to 
reject principles allowing air travel by the time he realizes that it will ultimately cost his 
life. Such intrapersonal comparison and weighing of risks and benefits does not rely on 
interpersonal aggregation, and indeed Scanlon does endorse it (1998, 237). Yet, as 
Ashford (2003) argues in her discussion of the demandingness of contractualism, this 
response will not work if some persons (vegans in the case of livestock farming; poor 
people in the case of air traffic) cannot benefit from these practices and only can 
experience the risks, however small, that are imposed on them. Their strong (ex post) 
complaints against allowing a practice that may cost their lives are not unreasonable and 
cannot be outweighed by the complaints others would have against prohibiting air travel 
or livestock farming. Hence, including ex post perspectives would turn contractualist 
deliberations extremely risk-averse, but contractualism cannot accommodate the most 
plausible response: that it would require disproportionate and unreasonably demanding 
precautions.5 
Let me sum up the argument so far. Contractualism seemed to be a good 
candidate for defending the rule of rescue, because it restricts moral deliberation to 
claims of individuals and rejects the idea that very strong reasons of one individual can 
be outweighed by combining weaker claims of the many. However, the contractualist 
defense of the rule of rescue only succeeds if it excludes from deliberation the ex post 
perspectives of persons who stand to gain from alternative principles (viz., favoring 
prevention). A very plausible argument for restricting deliberation to ex ante perspectives 
is that this avoids extremely risk-averse implications, but this argument involves 
considerations that conflict with the basic tenets of contractualism. Hence, unless we find 
a different argument for excluding ex post perspectives that is also coherent with 
contractualism, the theory does not appear to offer support for the rule of rescue. To the 
contrary, as far as contractualism allows aggregation of comparable claims, it will 
support principles and practices that save more lives rather than less. 
                                                            
5 Neither can contractualism accommodate the related concern that a good and flourishing society is one 
where people succeed in striking a reasonable balance between demanding precautions and protection 
against risk. Contractualist deliberation is about personal reasons of individuals, and collective, impersonal 
concerns are left out of consideration. 
For that matter, even if we had convincing reasons for restricting the deliberation 
to ex ante perspectives, it is still not obvious that this would lead to accepting the rule of 
rescue for all rescue cases. This would depend on how we reconstruct the problem. If 
decisions about allocation of resources are made at the time and place where some 
patients need very expensive life-saving treatment, it will be clear that their actual 
concerns outweigh those of other persons, who only run a risk of harm. But the policy 
issue could also be one of deciding whether, for the upcoming period, a specific budget 
should be allocated for all persons who will need life-saving treatment in that period. 
Many of those patients may not yet be identified, and their ex ante concerns will not be 
more weighty than those of persons who run a risk that will be taken away if prevention 
is prioritized over rescue. On the other hand, some patients are known: notably those who 
have been ill already for some time; hence, in this scenario the rule of rescue is applicable 
to their case, but not to that of persons who will (in the upcoming period) unexpectedly 
become severely ill and need expensive treatment. In other words: if contractualists 
decide to allocate a specific budget for expensive life-saving treatment, the budget will 
only be available for patients who were in need of care during the contractualist 
deliberation. The timing of decision-making about resource allocation will thus be a 
decisive factor for answering the question whether a patient will receive expensive life-
saving treatment or not. This would be highly arbitrary, if not unfair. How can such a 
policy be justified to patients whose need for some expensive life-saving treatment arises 
just after the policy is decided—and who therefore will not get treatment? Apparently 
contractualism does not offer a clear and convincing justification for the rule of rescue. 
5. A Collectivist Argument for the Rule of Rescue 
So far we have focused on the strength of reasons of individual persons whose lives 
depend on the rule of rescue. Instead we might ask what it would mean for us, as a 
society, to abandon the idea behind the rule of rescue and decide that, as far as human 
lives are concerned, we should always opt for saving most lives, including those we 
might save in the future. Think of mine accidents in which miners get trapped deep in a 
mine, and where no costs are spared to save them. An extreme example is the 2010 
Copiapó mining accident: 33 miners got stuck in a Chilean copper and gold mine, 700 
meters underground, and all were saved after a 69-day rescue operation. The successful 
operation cost between $10 million and $20 million, of which, according to the president 
of Chili, every peso was well spent. But what if not 33 but “only” three were trapped and 
saved? For our analysis, the question is if in such a case, for moral reasons, the money 
had been better spent on taking precautions to prevent more mine accidents in the future. 
A good government cares about current and future suffering, and prudent allocation of 
resources may imply favoring cost-effective prevention over expensive and uncertain 
rescue attempts. The Copiapó mining accident is a difficult case for a nuanced ethical 
analysis given the extensive media coverage that exposed and enlarged any detail of 
social interest. But also in mine accidents that receive less global public exposure, it is 
difficult to justify a choice to abandon further rescue operations and divert the money to 
making all mines and other workplaces safer. The government would be deemed 
insensitive, harsh, and lacking any compassion. Such concerns will be put forward first 
and foremost by the trapped miners’ families, who probably would be willing to spend 
whatever they have to rescue their loved ones. Yet their reasons—reasons of love—are 
personal reasons, and other people cannot be expected to completely share those personal 
reasons. Fellow citizens can, however, empathize with the fate of the victims and the 
need of family members to see their loved ones come back alive. In times of disaster, 
often—certainly not always—people are prepared to share in the burdens of their 
neighbors or fellow citizens as they perceive the disaster not just as a problem for the 
victims and their loved ones, but as a disaster for their community at large. Diverting the 
resources from rescue to prevention might be rational if the sole aim is to save as many 
lives as possible, but it would in fact negate the importance of the fact that people are 
standing together, sharing hope and fear, and supporting each other in the face of—and 
fight against—disaster. 
This collective attitude of standing together, sharing burdens, even accepting 
grave risks in attempts to save or protect some whose lives are endangered, is a form of 
“solidarity” par excellence. Solidarity is a complex concept (Prainsack and Buyx 2011). 
Some solidaristic practices involve standing together, sharing costs and risks in such a 
way that all participants benefit. By joining forces it becomes possible to attain goods 
that otherwise were not attainable. In such cases, solidarity is just a matter of joint action 
for a common interest, and hence it is rational for individuals to participate in such joint 
actions. Cooperative insurance programs are good examples of such rational solidarity. 
In relation to the rule of rescue, a different form of rationality—constitutive solidarity—is 
more relevant (Dawson and Verweij 2012). Constitutive solidarity goes beyond acting for 
a common interest. As a value it is not universally valid or applicable, but dependent on 
an existing (or at least emerging) sense of community within a group of people. By 
seeing solidarity as a reason for acting, hence by sharing in the burdens of some, people 
attach meaning to their living together. For a value like solidarity to be action guiding, it 
is essential that a threat to some members of the community be felt as a threat to the 
community as a whole. Arguably such feelings are evoked much more easily if a threat is 
real and acute and if it concerns identifiable persons who—together with their loved 
ones—are indeed considered to belong to the community. Mine accidents where workers 
are trapped in a mine are paradigm cases—not only because it is easy and horrible to 
envisage their fate but also because often miners and their families, colleagues, and 
friends live in a community, city, or region in which identity is strongly linked to the 
mining industry. Moreover, the disaster and rescue operation will further strengthen this 
identity, by means of narratives highlighting the perseverance, courage, and trust of both 
the victims and the rescue team. Note that this appeal to constitutive solidarity goes 
beyond appealing to the idea that “this could happen to me as well.” This latter thought 
will be shared by all miners, and indeed for them rescue policies would be a matter of 
rational solidarity as well. The argument in terms of constitutive solidarity implies that 
the threat to some miners is felt as a threat to the whole community—which could be the 
village, but also province or country.6 
From the perspective of the community, solidarity is both instrumentally and 
intrinsically valuable. It is instrumentally valuable as it engenders social cohesion and 
hence promotes collective and individual well-being (Lanzi 2001). Solidarity is 
intrinsically valuable as far as it is constitutive to the community itself and connecting the 
                                                            
6 Experiencing a threat to the community will be most easy when the threat is real, as in a war or a natural 
disaster. The argument of solidarity I suggest, however, involves a threat that is in important respects 
symbolic. The risk that a trapped miner will not survive is perceived as a threat to the larger community—
but arguably the community itself will not break down if the miner dies before he can be saved. But if an 
expensive rescue operation of a trapped miner is abandoned because more lives can be saved by preventive 
measures—that will be a real threat to the community. 
lives and narratives of individuals in a meaningful way. Policies that insist on cost-
effectiveness and accept that “rescue” attempts that are not sufficiently cost-effective 
should be abandoned, negate the collective dimensions of some rescue operations and the 
ways such operations signify that victims and their loved ones are not left on their own, 
but that we as a group are standing with them. Solidarity may render support to the rule 
of rescue, in the sense that communities in some cases have reason to give special weight 
to protecting or rescuing threatened community members and hence sharing the concerns 
of the loved ones of those endangered persons. The value of such concerted actions is not 
just their outcome in terms of the number of lives saved but also the meaning this joint 
action and attitude has for the community as such. Moreover, protecting identifiable 
persons against an immediate threat, and standing with their loved ones resisting the 
threat, sometimes even involving heroic action or self-sacrifice, may express and promote 
a sense of community in ways that are unattainable by policies that reduce more abstract 
risks. 
6. Limitations of the Argument 
This justification of the rule of rescue is, however, not unlimited. One limitation of the 
argument is related to its pluralist nature: the argument takes both solidarity and saving 
lives to be of value; hence it would be unreasonable to invest all available resources in 
rescuing people here and now and discard any concern about how many more lives can 
be saved by investing in prevention and precaution. A second limitation of the argument 
of solidarity is that it requires telling a story about community identity that is not always 
there. Some risks or situations are more easily conceived of as threatening the community 
than others. As explained above, the situation of workers trapped in a mine is a 
paradigmatic example. The fate of the workers is clearly connected to the identity of the 
village community, and the identity of the mining village—and of any other mining 
town—connects to the economic history of the country as a whole. The village 
community would disintegrate if the miners were just abandoned and preference were 
given to more cost-effective prevention policies. Mining industries often have an 
important role in the history and economy of the country that offers meaning to national 
appeals to solidarity, and national support for rescue attempts. The rhetorics that are used 
in such support (“a national disaster,” “no cost will be spared to save our fellows,” “we 
are all standing together in this rescue operation,” etc.) and the perseverance and sacrifice 
of rescue teams, witnessed by the public at large, may further strengthen shared feelings 
of solidarity. 
But in what other situations is someone’s need experienced as a threat to the 
community at large? More specifically, would this argument for the rule of rescue work 
in the context of resource allocation in public healthcare? Suppose that several patients 
with a very rare disease can be saved by giving them lifelong access to extremely 
expensive treatment. Patient groups and family members may be successful in mobilizing 
public concern and support for making treatment available, but it is less clear in what 
sense the disease—or a decision to refrain from offering treatment—is to be understood 
by the community as a collective evil. Of course, there is no reason for thinking that a 
strong community could not perceive it as a collective threat or evil. The strength of the 
solidarity argument, however, depends on the possibilities of telling a story that connects 
the threat to certain individuals with the identity of the larger community, and such a 
story is much more obvious in the example of the trapped miners than in the case of 
severely ill patients. It may be easy for everyone to empathize with the patients and their 
needs, if only because we all will sooner or later become ill and face death, but that is not 
sufficient to perceive the threat to those patients as a threat to one’s community and 
oneself. Therefore, applying the rule of rescue to life-saving medical treatment is not 
intrinsically and instrumentally valuable in a way that is comparable to the mine accident 
example. 
The appeal to solidarity in support of concerted action to rescue some individuals 
is not only limited in scope, it can also be morally problematic itself. As argued above, 
solidarity as a moral argument can only be effective if there is already a sense (or 
emerging sense) of community in place, and if the persons to be rescued are in fact 
considered as belonging to the group. But is it morally justified to let decisions about 
saving someone’s life depend on collective judgments about whether that person does or 
does not belong to “us”? Many features may then play a role that, from a moral point of 
view, are irrelevant: how attractive, popular, or sociable a person is, how long he has 
been living “here,” the influence of his family in the community, and so on. Such 
partiality is especially problematic in public policy. Certainly in modern healthcare, 
where resources are always limited and resource allocation requires a continuous 
weighing of competing claims, decisions to offer expensive treatment need to be fair and 
just, and the fact that some persons or their families are more popular or influential than 
others should not play a role at all. 
This is not to say that there is no place for solidarity in healthcare. To the 
contrary, public healthcare systems that guarantee universal access to basic care can be 
understood as an institutionalized form of solidarity in which the costs of collective 
provision are shared by all. Yet if such a system is in place, then the competing claims for 
finite resources should be dealt with in a just and fair way. In this discussion, a solidarity-
inspired rule of rescue does not have a place. The analogy with rescue operations in mine 
disasters does not succeed, and, moreover, decisions should be based upon considerations 
of justice and fairness, not solidarity. 
7. Conclusion 
The rule of rescue holds that special weight should be given to protecting the lives of 
assignable individuals in need, implying that less weight is given to considerations of 
cost-effectiveness. This is sometimes invoked as an argument for funding or reimbursing 
life-saving treatment in public healthcare even if the costs of such treatment are extreme. 
At first sight one might assume that an individualist approach to ethics—such as 
Scanlon’s contractualism—would offer a promising route to justification of the rule of 
rescue. In this chapter I have argued that contractualism cannot endorse the rule of 
rescue, whereas a collectivist approach that appeals to group solidarity would offer 
support for rescue cases. The argument, however, has its limitations, and though 
solidarity is of central concern in shaping public healthcare, there are good reasons for 
not endorsing the rule of rescue as a moral basis for allocating scarce resources in clinical 
care. 
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